NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Volume 45

Number 2

Article 7

4-1-2020

Provenience and Provenance Intersecting with International Law
in the Market for Antiquities
Patty G. Gerstenblith

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Patty G. Gerstenblith, Provenience and Provenance Intersecting with International Law in the Market for
Antiquities, 45 N.C. J. INT'L L. 457 (2020).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol45/iss2/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of Carolina Law
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

Provenience and Provenance Intersecting with
International Law in the Market for Antiquities
Patty Gerstenblith†
I.
II.
III.

IV.

V.

Introduction ............................................................... 457
Provenance and Provenience ..................................... 461
The International Legal Framework for Controlling the
Market in Antiquities ................................................. 469
A. The 1970 UNESCO Convention and its Domestic
Implementation by Market States ....................... 470
B. State Ownership .................................................... 475
Legal Roles of Provenience and Provenance............. 476
A. Where is Legality? The Problem of Location....... 477
B. When is Legality? The Problem of Time .............. 487
C. What is Legality? Objects in Transit .................... 490
Conclusion ................................................................. 495

I. Introduction
International trade in archaeological artifacts has become
increasingly fraught, as armed conflict and political instability have
spread since 2003 throughout the archaeologically rich regions of
the Middle East and North Africa, accompanied by destruction of
historic and religious structures, looting of archaeological sites, and
thefts from cultural and religious repositories.1 As a result, the

† Patty Gerstenblith is a Distinguished Research Professor at DePaul University College
of Law.
1 Fiona Greenland et al., We’re Just Beginning to Grasp the Toll of the Islamic
State’s Archaeological Looting in Syria, THE RAND BLOG (May 15, 2019),
https://www.rand.org/blog/2019/05/were-just-beginning-to-grasp-the-toll-of-theislamic.html [https://perma.cc/7TEG-HAEQ]; Megan Gannon, “Space Archaeologists”
Show Spike in Looting at Egypt’s Ancient Sites, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Feb. 29, 2016),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/space-archaeologists-show-spike-in-lootingat-egypt-s-ancient-sites/ [https://perma.cc/2CMV-3CFA]; Brigit Katz, New Online
Database Catalogues 20,000 Threatened Archeological Sites, SMITHSONIAN (June 1,
2017), https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/new-online-database-catalogues20000-threatened-archaeological-sites-180963451/ [https://perma.cc/4GBK-6FV9].
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intersection of the antiquities trade with international law and the
domestic law of individual market states has expanded
significantly.2 The trade in undocumented or poorly documented
antiquities incentivizes looting3 of archaeological sites to supply the
market,4 resulting in detrimental effects and negative consequences
for our ability to reconstruct and understand the past.5 The artifact
is decontextualized and what it can tell us about the past is limited
to the information intrinsic within the object itself, rather than what
might have been learned from the object’s full associated context.6
Because of the negative externalities imposed on society through
the looting of archaeological sites, a body of international and
domestic law has developed to reduce the economic incentive to
loot archaeological sites and to trade in such artifacts.7 Because
2 See Patty Gerstenblith, Controlling the International Market in Antiquities:
Reducing the Harm, Preserving the Past, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 169, 174–77 (2007) (discussing
the progression of international law in an attempt to stem the sale and trafficking of looted
archaeological artifacts).
3 A looted antiquity is one recovered from the ground in an unscientific manner and
may be characterized as illegal depending on applicable legal provisions. Siobhan M. Hart
& Elizabeth S. Chilton, Digging and Destruction: Artifact Collecting as Meaningful Social
Practice, 21 INT’L J. HERITAGE STUD. 1, 2 (2014) (“[Looting is] the act of digging up
artifacts for private collection or sale without the concomitant record of excavation,
context and lab work associated with scientific archaeology.”).
4 See Morag M. Kersel, From the Ground to the Buyer: A Market Analysis of the
Trade in Illegal Antiquities, in ARCHAEOLOGY, CULTURAL HERITAGE, & THE ANTIQUITIES
TRADE 188, 188 (Neil Brodie et al. eds., 2006) (describing the role of the international art
market and the demand for artifacts from Western collectors in incentivizing the looting
of sites).
5 See Gerstenblith, supra note 2, at 170–74 (discussing information lost through
looting of archaeological sites); see also Laetitia La Follette, The Trial of Marion True and
Changing Policies for Classical Antiquities in American Museums, in NEGOTIATING
CULTURE: HERITAGE, OWNERSHIP, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 38, 42–44, 51–54
(Laetitia La Follette ed., 2013) [hereinafter La Follette, The Trial of Marion True]
(discussing the information lost through looting of the Euphronios krater and what is
learned from scientifically excavated objects).
6 See Gerstenblith, supra note 2, at 172; see also Alex W. Barker, Provenience,
Provenance and Context(s), in THE FUTURES OF OUR PASTS: ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF
COLLECTING ANTIQUITIES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 19, 20 (Michael A. Adler &
Susan Benton Bruning eds., 2012) (“[C]ontext . . . refers to the association of an object
that allows its importance or significance to be assessed.”).
7 See Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import,
Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property arts. 2–3, Nov. 14, 1970, 823
U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter 1970 UNESCO Convention] (recognizing the harms of selling
looted artifacts and declaring that it shall be illegal to do so); Convention on Cultural
Property Implementation Act (CPIA), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2602–2603 (2018) (providing a
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such objects are, by definition, previously undocumented, they are
particularly suited to the illegal trade and also pose a particular
challenge to law and law enforcement.8 For these reasons, this
Article is limited to discussing looted artifacts that were not
documented in a public or private collection before their illegal
removal and entry into the market.
While a body of general international and national law and lex
specialis has developed to regulate this trade and thereby reduce
demand for artifacts, not as much attention has been paid to the
specific applications of and compliance with this body of law.9 This
Article aims to address this lacuna by examining the law and its
enforcement through the lens of the concepts of provenience and
provenance—both of which are crucial to understanding the
international market and efforts to control its illegal aspects.10 This
area of the law is inherently interdisciplinary, intersecting with the
scholarly disciplines of art history, archaeology, and
anthropology.11 As a result, the law has borrowed terms, including

mechanism by which the United States can impose restrictions on the import of
undocumented archaeological materials).
8 See Celestine Bohlen, Escalating the War on Looting, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/12/arts/international/escalating-the-war-onlooting.html [https://perma.cc/DWB6-TDAB] (“But investigations rarely produce arrests
because of the difficulty in proving the provenance of antiquities, often produced by
civilizations that stretched across the ancient world.”).
9 See generally Gerstenblith, supra note 2, at 172–74 (analyzing the market for
looted artifacts and what course of action would be best, from a legal perspective, to help
reign in the demand for and trade in looted materials).
10 This article specifically deals with issues of provenance and provenience as related
to looted archaeological artifacts. For a discussion of other legal issues implicated in the
black market antiquities trade, see generally Karin Orenstein, Risking Criminal Liability
in Cultural Property Transactions, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 527 (2020) (discussing the
intersection of laws governing looted art and U.S. criminal law); Leila Amineddoleh, The
Politicizing of Cultural Heritage, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 333 (2020) (discussing the
repatriation of cultural heritage and the political calculations involved); Stefan Cassella,
Recovering Stolen Art & Antiquities Under the Forfeiture Laws: Who Is Entitled to the
Property When There Are Conflicting Claims, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 393 (2020) (providing
an overview of civil asset forfeiture laws and how they work to assist in the recovery of
looted cultural patrimony). For a discussion of the comparative considerations involved
in repatriating looted artifacts and Nazi-looted art, see generally Marc Masurovsky, A
Comparative Look at Nazi Plundered Art, Looted Antiquities, & Stolen Indigenous
Objects, 45 N.C. J. INT’L L. 497 (2020) (discussing looted indigenous art, looted
archaeological artifacts, and Nazi plunder, as well as the sociological implications thereof).
11 See infra notes 21–51 and accompanying text.
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provenience and provenance, from these disciplines.12 Despite the
essential role that these terms play in both the policy and
practicalities of the legal framework for controlling the market in
antiquities, these terms do not have clear legal definitions.13 Rather,
the law has adopted these terms and their definitions from the
academic disciplines of art history, archaeology, and anthropology,
but, in doing so, the law has at times hampered rather than facilitated
effective law enforcement efforts.14 As the terms serve different
purposes in these different contexts, it is not surprising that they
should also have different meanings.15
By examining the origins of these terms in their art historical,
archaeological, and anthropological milieus, and the roles that these
concepts should play in the legal framework, this Article will
propose legal definitions for the terms “provenience” and
“provenance” and will consider how these definitions make the law
more effective in controlling the trade in previously unknown and
undocumented archaeological artifacts.16 This Article begins with
a discussion of the terms “provenance” and “provenience” as they
originated and are understood in the art historical, archaeological,
and anthropological literature.17 The Article then turns to a brief
overview of the international legal framework and domestic
implementation of that framework, whose purpose is to control the

12 See Klein v. Unidentified Wrecked & Abandoned Sailing Vessel, 758 F.2d 1511,
1513 (11th Cir. 1985) (explicitly relying on the way “provenience” is used in the field of
archaeology).
13 See Carrie Betts, Enforcement of Foreign Cultural Patrimony Laws in U.S. Courts:
Lessons for Museums from the Getty Trial and Cultural Partnership Agreements of 2006,
4 S.C. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 73, 74–75 (2007) (“Despite its centrality in the art world, no
uniform rule or custom, or usage of the trade, exists to codify either the precise elements
of provenance or a standard for how provenance research should be conducted . . . .”).
14 See Gerstenblith, supra note 2, at 178–80 (establishing that it is likely most market
participants are unconcerned about lack of sufficient provenance information, and that a
lack of sufficient provenance information makes it difficult for law enforcement actions to
establish that an artifact was stolen). See also Jane Levine, The Importance of Provenance
Documentation in the Market For Ancient Art and Artifacts: The Future of the Market May
Depend on Documenting the Past, 16 DEPAUL J. ART, TECH. & INTELL. PROP. L. 219, 229–
32 (sellers’ and museums’ standards to establish appropriate provenance were often
lacking at best, and there were issues with confidentiality or missing documents, which
made it relatively easy for stolen or looted articles to be acquired and sold).
15 See infra notes 21–51 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 100–200 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 21–51 and accompanying text.
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market in antiquities.18 Third, the Article will offer definitions of
“provenience” and “provenance” that are more suitable to the legal
context and will present examples and justifications for why these
different definitions are necessary.19 The Article proposes that
while the concepts of provenience and provenance are useful in
determining legality and in effectuating law enforcement efforts,20
the law also needs to adapt these definitions appropriately to their
legal context in order to accomplish these goals.
II. Provenance and Provenience
The anthropologist Rosemary Joyce has focused on the use of
provenance and provenience in the determination of whether an
archaeological object is authentic.21 Joyce looked at these terms as
representing the concepts of place (where is authenticity),22 time
(when is authenticity),23 and a fluid understanding of the meaning
of an object’s authenticity as it moves from its origin to its current
resting place (what is authenticity).24 Particularly for this last
See infra notes 52–99 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 100–200 and accompanying text.
20 See id.
21 Rosemary A. Joyce, When is Authentic? Situating Authenticity in Itineraries of
Objects, in CREATING AUTHENTICITY: AUTHENTICATION PROCESSES IN ETHNOGRAPHIC
MUSEUMS 39, 44 (Alex Geurds & Laura van Broekhaven eds., 2013) [hereinafter Joyce,
When is Authentic?]. Joyce commented that “authenticity is embroiled in a nexus of place
and time that . . . underlies intertwined archaeological and art historical concepts used to
secure knowledge: provenience and provenance.” Id. at 44.
22 Id. at 44–48.
23 Joyce described the concept of when an object is authentic as “[t]he networks
composed by circulating objects at a given time are transformed into itineraries unfolding
in time. Authenticity becomes, like provenience and provenance, a way to characterize an
object during its transit, rather than being something inherent in it as a kind of essence,
lent by some particular circumstances of production or use.” Id. at 51–54.
24 Id. at 48–51. Kersel identifies three stages in the trafficking of antiquities from
the ground to the buyer: the archaeologically rich market or country of origin; transit
markets; and destination markets. Kersel, supra note 4, at 189–94. She notes that all three
stages may exist within a single country, such as in Israel. Id. at 190–91. However, in the
paradigm used in this Article, which addresses international law, the various stages are
located in different countries. Campbell identified four stages: looter stage; early-stage
intermediary; late-stage intermediary; and collector. Peter B. Campbell, The Illicit
Antiquities Trade as a Transnational Criminal Network: Characterizing and Anticipating
Trafficking of Cultural Heritage, 20 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 113, 116 (2013). Both
authors recognize that numerous actors could be involved at each stage while the same
actor can fulfill more than one role. In their study of the looting of Cambodian antiquities
during the Khmer Rouge period, Simon Mackenzie and Tess Davis found that “antiquities
18
19
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element, the concept of object itineraries is useful in describing the
movement of objects through time and space.25 Joyce emphasized
that through the concept of object itineraries, we can see the
mobility of objects, “the routes by which things circulate in and out
of places where they come to rest or are active. . . . Treating things
as active in transit puts even partial and collective object histories
into context as segments of potentially unending itineraries that
shape space and enable action.”26 This Article will apply these
trafficking ‘networks’ might be thought of as more stable, hierarchical and repetitively
functioning supply chains rather than the highly fluid picture that has been developed both
in the general organized crime literature and in recent papers in the illicit antiquities subfield.” Simon Mackenzie & Tess Davis, Temple Looting in Cambodia: Anatomy of a
Statue Trafficking Network, 54 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 722, 737 (2014). Yates and Smith,
in contrast to many other authors, examined the middle stage—the trafficking networks
that move an object from its discovery to current location. Donna Yates & Emiline Smith,
Antiquities Trafficking and the Provenance Problem, in COLLECTING AND PROVENANCE: A
MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 385, 387 (Jane Milosch and Nick Pearce eds., 2019).
25 See Rosemary A. Joyce, Things in Motion: Itineraries of Ulua Marble Vases, in
THINGS IN MOTION: OBJECT ITINERARIES IN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PRACTICE 21, 29
(Rosemary A. Joyce & Susan D. Gillespie eds., 2015) [hereinafter Joyce, Things in
Motion].
26 Id. Some scholars refer to an object’s biography and see three phases or “lives”:
first, the history of the object in antiquity before it is buried in the ground; second, the
burial of the object in the ground with its associated stratigraphic context; and, third, the
history of the object after its removal from the ground. See, e.g., Christopher Chippindale
& David W. Gill, Material Consequences of Contemporary Classical Collecting, 104 AM.
J. ARCHAEOLOGY 463, 468 (2000). Compare with Laetitia La Follette, The Impact of the
1970 UNESCO Convention on Unprovenanced Etruscan Antiquities in the United States,
in COLLECTING AND COLLECTORS FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERNITY 75, 76 (Alexandra
Carpina et al. eds., 2018) [hereinafter La Follette, The Impact of the 1970 UNESCO
Convention] (phrasing these lives slightly differently in that she characterizes the first
“life” as only the moment of its creation and its immediate milieu; the second as the
object’s history until its deposition; and the third its post-removal in modern times); see
also La Follette, The Trial of Marion True, supra note 5, at 44 (noting that art museums
privilege the first life, whereas the second and third lives are equally important and are
often more interesting and with greater educational value). Many scholars prefer the
concept of object itineraries, rather than biographies, because the former is less static and
encompasses a broader range of social and other networks for the object. See, e.g.,
Rosemary A. Joyce & Susan D. Gillespie, Making Things Out of Objects that Move, in
THINGS IN MOTION: OBJECT ITINERARIES IN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PRACTICE 3, 11–14
(Rosemary A. Joyce & Susan D. Gillespie eds., 2015); Alexander A. Bauer, The Kula of
Long Term Loans: Cultural Object Itineraries and the Promise of the Postcolonial
“Universal” Museum, in THINGS IN MOTION: OBJECT ITINERARIES IN ANTHROPOLOGICAL
PRACTICE 147, 148–49 (Rosemary A. Joyce & Susan D. Gillespie eds., 2015) (describing
how the concept of “object itineraries” is useful in understanding the movement of objects
and correcting for misperceptions around repatriation of artifacts); Morag M. Kersel,
Itinerant Objects: The Legal Lives of Levantine Artifacts, in THE SOCIAL ARCHAEOLOGY
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concepts to an exploration of determining the legal status of an
archaeological object and, more specifically, to proposing legal
definitions for the terms provenience and provenance. The same
concepts of time, place, and quality or meaning of legality may be
brought to bear in the determination of compliance with
international and domestic law.
The terms provenance and provenience have at times been
considered interchangeable,27 while some scholars viewed
provenience as referring only to the ownership history of
archaeological objects, in contrast to the term provenance referring
to the history of ownership of works of (non-archaeological) fine
art.28 In the art historical world, the term provenance typically
indicates the history of the ownership of a work of art from the time
of its creation.29 The ideal provenance would trace that ownership
history back to the hands of the artist to establish the twin principles

LEVANT FROM PREHISTORY TO THE PRESENT 594, 595 (Assaf Yasur-Landau et al.
eds., 2018).
27 According to Joyce, in the late nineteenth century, the term “provenance” was used
to identify the “stylistic assignment of objects to origins that were not known securely, and
provenience to identify known find sites, which could be relatively imprecise by modern
standards . . . .”. Joyce, When is Authentic?, supra note 21, at 44. See, e.g., Dennis Mizzi
& Jodi Magness, Provenance vs. Authenticity: An Archaeological Perspective on the Post2002 “Dead Sea Scrolls-Like” Fragments, 26 DEAD SEA DISCOVERIES 135, 137 n.5 (2019)
(defining the term “provenance” as referring to both an object’s archaeological context and
its post-discovery history of acquisition and ownership, although acknowledging that
sometimes these concepts are distinguished through use of the terms “provenience” and
“provenance,” respectively; to avoid confusion, the authors opted to use only the terms
provenance and unprovenanced, “in their all-encompassing sense.”).
28 See Rosemary A. Joyce, From Place to Place: Provenience, Provenance, and
Archaeology, in PROVENANCE: AN ALTERNATE HISTORY OF ART 48, 49–51 (Gail
Feigenbaum & Inge Reist eds., 2012) [hereinafter Joyce, From Place to Place] (setting out
the history of the two terms and explaining their different uses in archaeology and art
history, as well as geographical differences in how the terms are used). Some of the
distinction is also based on the different etymologies of the two words, although both have
the same meaning as the place of origin. Id. Chippindale and Gill identify “provenience”
as an American English usage and “provenance” as a British English usage. Chippindale
& Gill, supra note 26, at 467. Clemency Coggins commented that “[t]he differences
[between anthropological and aesthetic interests] are exemplified by the difference
between the stark English provenience, meaning the original context of an object, and the
more melodious French provenance, used by the art world, which may include the original
source but is primarily concerned with a history of ownership.” Clemency C. Coggins,
United States Cultural Property Legislation: Observations of a Combatant, 7 INT’L J.
CULTURAL PROP. 52, 57 (1998).
29 Joyce, When is Authentic?, supra note 21, at 39.
OF THE
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of authenticity and legality, both of which are integral to the
functioning of the art market and to achieving a full and accurate
understanding of the art historical record.30
The first publication to analyze in detail the role of provenance
(or lack thereof) in the archaeological literature was a study,
authored by David Gill and Christopher Chippindale, of several
large collections of classical antiquities.31 The authors created a
rubric for determining the relative reliability of the provenance
information included in exhibit catalogues of these collections,
although they acknowledged that it is difficult to evaluate whether
phrases such as “said to be from,” “probably,” “possibly,” or
“allegedly” indicate any differences in reliability.32 Both in these
earlier articles and more recently, Gill has advocated for different
terminology with respect to archaeological material and suggests
that the terms “collecting histories” and “archaeology” be used,
respectively, in place of provenance and provenience.33
Archaeology identifies the deposition of an object in the
ground or on a monument. The collecting history maps
the trail of the object once it has left the archaeological
deposit and then passes through the hands of individuals
or enters public collections. Indeed it is this documented
and authenticated collecting history that will ensure that
the owner, seller, or potential buyer on the market will
avoid those scandals that have now shadowed classical
collecting since the mid-1990s.34

30 Gail Feigenbaum & Inge Reist, Introduction, in PROVENANCE: AN ALTERNATE
HISTORY OF ART 1, 1–2 (Gail Feigenbaum & Inge Reist eds., 2012) (pointing out that until
recently provenance was considered a relatively unimportant aspect of a work of art, in
comparison with the milieu in which the work was created).
31 Chippindale & Gill, supra note 26. In an earlier study, Chippindale and Gill linked
the appearance of previously undocumented Cycladic figurines of the third millennium
BCE to the large-scale looting of Cycladic sites. David W.J. Gill & Christopher
Chippindale, Material and Intellectual Consequences of Esteem for Cycladic Figures, 97
AM. J. ARCHAEOLOGY 601, 608–15 (1993).
32 Chippindale & Gill, supra note 26, at 469. But see Elizabeth Marlowe, What We
Talk About When We Talk About Provenance: A Response to Chippindale and Gill, 23
INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 217, 218 (2016) (criticizing this “provenance scale” as detracting
from the more significant question of whether it is possible to determine the authenticity
of a decontextualized object).
33 David W.J. Gill, Thinking About Collecting Histories: A Response to Marlowe, 23
INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 237, 237 (2016).
34 Id. See generally La Follette, The Trial of Marion True, supra note 5 (discussing
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Other scholars have advocated for different terms in the hope of
capturing the significance of an object’s modern history with the
goal, primarily, of establishing authenticity but also of establishing
legality.35 Elizabeth Marlowe has rejected use of the terms
“provenanced” and “unprovenanced.”36 She suggests that the terms
“grounded” and “ungrounded” should be used to indicate whether
an object can be traced back to its archaeological find spot in order
to know conclusively whether it is authentic, regardless of the
method of its recovery from the ground.37 In Marlowe’s view, “[w]e
the referenced scandals); PETER WATSON & CECILIA TODESCHINI, THE MEDICI
CONSPIRACY: THE ILLICIT JOURNEY OF LOOTED ANTIQUITIES, FROM ITALY’S TOMB RAIDERS
TO THE WORLD’S GREATEST MUSEUM (Public Affairs 2007).
35 See Elizabeth Marlowe, What We Talk About When We Talk About Provenance:
A Response to Chippindale and Gill, 23 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 217 (2016).
36 An undocumented, “unprovenanced,” or poorly provenanced antiquity is one that
has poor or only recent evidence of its ownership history and how it was obtained. La
Follette, The Trial of Marion True, supra note 5, at 58 (stating that these terms are often
used to indicate an artifact that was not recovered through systematic archaeological
excavation or one that lacks “information about both provenance and provenience, that is,
works that did not come out of an official excavation or a long-established private
collection.”). The concept, even if not the exact terminology, is often used more
specifically in voluntary codes and guidelines of professional organizations. Such codes
include those of museum associations, e.g. ASS’N OF ART MUSEUM DIRECTORS,
GUIDELINES ON THE ACQUISITION OF ARCHAEOLOGICAL MATERIAL AND ANCIENT ART (Jan.
29,
2013),
https://aamd.org/sites/default/files/document/AAMD%20Guidelines%202013.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MD39-NGG3]; see also Laetitia La Follette, Looted Antiquities, Art
Museums and Restitution in the United States since 1970, 52 J. CONTEMPORARY HISTORY
669, 673–74 (2017) (discussing the exceptions to the 1970 standard adopted by the
Association of Art Museum Directors). Professional associations, such as the
Archaeological Institute of America, also use these terms to indicate an antiquity whose
existence outside of the modern country of discovery is not documented before 1970, the
date of adoption of the 1970 UNESCO Convention. See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra
note 7. See, e.g., Naomi Norman, Editorial Policy on the Publication of Recently Acquired
Antiquities, 109 AM. J. ARCHAEOLOGY 135, 135 (2005). This is often referred to as the
“1970 rule” or “1970 standard.” See also Neil Brodie & Colin Renfrew, Looting and the
World’s Archaeological Heritage: The Inadequate Response, 34 ANN. REV.
ANTHROPOLOGY 343, 351 (2005); Patty Gerstenblith, Do Restrictions on Publication of
Undocumented Texts Promote Legitimacy?, in ARCHAEOLOGIES OF TEXT: ARCHAEOLOGY,
TECHNOLOGY, AND ETHICS 214 (Matthew T. Rutz & Morag M. Kersel eds., 2014); La
Follette, The Impact of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 26, at 76–78. For the
editorial practices of different scholarly journals, see John F. Cherry, Publishing
Undocumented Texts: Editorial Perspectives, in ARCHAEOLOGIES OF TEXT:
ARCHAEOLOGY, TECHNOLOGY, AND ETHICS 227, 231–40 (Matthew T. Rutz & Morag M.
Kersel eds., 2014).
37 Marlowe, supra note 35, at 224–25.
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can never be certain that [artworks without a recorded findspot] are
what they seem to be, regardless of when they surfaced, their fame,
the number of decades or centuries they have spent in prestigious
collections, or the renown of the scholars who have studied them.”38
The concept of the history of a work of art, when applied to an
archaeological artifact, is more complex.39 The provenance of an
archaeological artifact should similarly refer to its history from the
time of its creation, thereby including the object’s pre-deposition
history, from the time of its creation to its burial in the ground, its
deposition, its excavation and its post-discovery history.40
However, it is very difficult to trace an archaeological object or a
work of ancient art to the original artist and the moment of its
creation. There are some exceptions, including art works that are
part of immovable monuments, such as the Parthenon in Athens.41
But such works are traceable only if they have not been
dismembered and dispersed over time, with their original context
now lost. The artist may be known, as in the case of the Euphronios
krater, if the artist’s name appears on the object itself, but its predeposition history may not be fully known.42 Joyce points out that
the provenance of Ulua Marble vases should be viewed as beginning
at the site of Travesia in Honduras, where the vases were produced,
before their use and subsequent deposition in what became an
archaeological site.43 On the other hand, the post-deposition or postrecovery history of an object tells us about modern society—
patterns of looting, archaeological excavation practices, history of
38 ELIZABETH MARLOWE, SHAKY GROUND: CONTEXT, CONNOISSEURSHIP AND THE
HISTORY OF ROMAN ART 4 (2013) (criticizing the use of the parallel terms “provenanced”
and “unprovenanced” because she asserts that the distinction between ownership history
and findspot is blurred); see also Marlowe, supra note 35, at 218–19. The potential for
this confusion is illustrated by the way Mizzi and Magness use the term provenance, see
Mizzi & Magness, supra note 27; see also La Follette, The Impact of the 1970 UNESCO
Convention, supra note 26, at 75 (using the term “unprovenanced” to indicate an object
that was not systematically recovered from the ground). But see Joyce, When is
Authentic?, supra note 21, at 41–43 (accepting the authenticity of objects, in this case,
marble Ulua vases from Honduras, that were acquired for collections before this category
of object received scholarly publication and became popular on the art market).
39 Id. at 49–50.
40 See id.
41 See, e.g., WILLIAM ST. CLAIR, LORD ELGIN & THE MARBLES: THE CONTROVERSIAL
HISTORY OF THE PARTHENON SCULPTURES (Oxford University Press 1998).
42 Barker, supra note 6, at 26.
43 Joyce, When is Authentic?, supra note 21, at 45–46.
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collecting and aesthetics, and legal changes, among other aspects of
knowledge.44
Rosemary Joyce has defined the terms provenance and
provenience as:
This distinction illuminates the reason these two concepts
promote such different understandings: provenience is a fixed
point, while provenance can be considered an itinerary that an
object follows as it moves from hand to hand. Where the two
concepts intersect is the place that the archaeological provenience
singles out as the only important location in this itinerary, the find
site.45

Joyce further commented that while provenience gives
archaeological objects a “secure, interpretable context, . . . their
cultural interpretation rests on knowledge of their provenance[.]”46
So with the legal understanding of archaeological artifacts, one
might posit that, from a legal perspective, provenience determines
what law is initially applicable, while provenance is crucial to
compliance with the law and to law enforcement efforts as an object
moves through the market across international borders and to its
current location.47 Thus, provenience gives a single fixed spot from
which to begin an analysis of legality, but it is provenance that tells
the object’s full story from both a legal and contemporary cultural
perspective beginning in antiquity to the present.48
This Article will maintain the relatively traditional uses of these

Id. at 46.
Joyce, From Place to Place, supra note 28, at 48. Joyce further defines
provenience in the archaeological context as “a three-dimensional location in space.” Id.
at 49. Barker includes the materials found in association with an object and “the postdeposition processes that may affect the location and association of objects, deposits or
their juxtaposition” in that object’s provenience. See Barker, supra note 6, at 19–20
(stating that “context refers to the association of an object that allows its importance or
significance to be assessed . . . [and] nearly always refers to the significance of the object
within one or more cultural-historical or theoretical constructs based upon provenience.”).
46 Joyce, When is Authentic?, supra note 21, at 46.
47 Megan Winget, The Archival Principle of Provenance and Its Application to
Image Content Management Systems, U. TEX. LIBRARIES 1, 3–5 (Aug. 26, 2008),
https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/bitstream/handle/2152/412/Winget_ProvenanceImage
Mgmt.pdf [https://perma.cc/3BHW-9TS6].
48 Bauer, supra note 26, at 148–49 (extending the object itinerary and thus, by
extension, its provenance to include subsequent circulation that is not limited to transfers
of ownership but also transfers of physical possession through loans, such as among
museums).
44
45
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terms, while suggesting modifications for legal purposes. The legal
definition of provenance should be limited to indicating the history
of the ownership of an archaeological object only from the time of
its modern discovery. While the pre-deposition history of an object
is significant from an archaeological, art historical, and
anthropological perspective, this is not relevant to the legal status of
an artifact. In contrast to the art historical milieu, for legal purposes
in the case of archaeological artifacts, the history of ownership and
disposition of an object and, hence, its provenance, should be
viewed as beginning at the time of its “removal . . . from its context
of archaeological recovery,”49 rather than from the time of its
creation.50 The term provenience, as adapted for legal purposes, is
used to indicate the archaeological findspot and therefore
depositional or stratigraphic context of an archaeological object, but
findspot should be defined only as the country within whose borders
the object was discovered.
Although provenance and its
documentation are often considered of primary importance for
establishing the authenticity of a work of art,51 this Article focuses

49 Joyce, From Place to Place, supra note 28, at 48; see also Joyce, When is
Authentic?, supra note 21, at 45 (noting that the findspot is the intersection of location and
provenance).
50 La Follette, The Impact of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 26, at 80–
81 (arguing that provenience is significant for information about both an object’s second
life—how it was used in antiquity and whether it moved from point of creation to other
locations—and the object’s third life).
51 Provenance documentation is considered by the art world and, especially the art
market, as key to establishing the authenticity of a work of art. Fake provenance
documentation is typically used in the attempt to make inauthentic works of art appear to
be authentic. However, fake provenance documentation may also be used to establish the
appearance of legality of an authentic but illegal archaeological artifact. See United States
v. Schultz, 178 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 333 F.3d 393, 416 (2d Cir. 2003),
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1106 (2004) (illustrating perhaps the best-known example of forged
provenance documentation used to establish the legality of an authentic antiquity); Peter
Watson, The Investigation of Frederick Schultz, 10 CULTURE WITHOUT CONTEXT: NEWSL.
ILLICIT ANTIQUITIES RES. CTR. 21, 25 (2002) (discussing Schultz’s smuggling of artifacts
out of Egypt). In Schultz, a British conservator, Jonathan Tokeley-Parry, and a prominent
New York antiquities dealer, Frederick Schultz, conspired to smuggle artifacts out of
Egypt by disguising them as modern tourist trinkets. Tokeley-Parry established a fake old
collection, dubbed the Thomas Alcock collection, purportedly created by a relative in the
1920s, and assigned several of the smuggled artifacts to this collection. In furtherance of
this deception, Tokeley-Parry created old labels, using old typewriters, and discolored
them, again, to make them look old. See also Patty Gerstenblith, Provenances: Real, Fake
and Questionable, 26 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 285, 288–91 (2019) (discussing the
question of authenticity of art works and the use of forged or unreliable documentation).
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on the roles that provenance and provenience play in establishing
the legal status of an archaeological artifact, particularly in terms of
the international legal framework that attempts to regulate the
market in archaeological artifacts.
III. The International Legal Framework for Controlling the
Market in Antiquities
The international legal framework for regulating the market in
antiquities consists primarily of two elements.52 The first is the
broad international conventions, the 1970 UNESCO Convention on
the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (1970 UNESCO
Convention),53 and the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen and
Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention),54 as well as the domestic laws of the States Parties that
implement the provisions of the conventions into domestic law. The
second element of international law pertaining to the trade in
archaeological artifacts is the recognition granted to statutes vesting
ownership of undiscovered archaeological artifacts in the State.55
When such artifacts are looted and removed from the country of
discovery without permission, the artifacts are characterized as
stolen property, as case law in the major market countries of the

In 2019, the Metropolitan Museum of Art returned a coffin to Egypt that had been looted
in 2011. The Metropolitan purchased the coffin on the basis of a forged export license,
which indicated the coffin had been exported in 1971. Nancy Kenney, Looted Coffin
Acquired by Metropolitan Museum is Headed Back to Egypt, THE ART NEWSPAPER (Sept.
26,
2019),
https://www.theartnewspaper.com/news/looted-coffin-acquired-bymetropolitan-museum-is-headed-back-to-egypt [https://perma.cc/KMY2-MFD9].
52 See CRAIG FORREST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL
HERITAGE 133 (Routledge 2010).
53 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 7; see also PATRICK J. O’KEEFE,
PROTECTING CULTURAL OBJECTS: BEFORE AND AFTER 1970 (Institute of Art and Law 2017)
(providing a comprehensive review of the Convention).
54 Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 24, 1995, 34
I.L.M. 1322 [hereinafter UNIDROIT Convention]; see also LYNDEL V. PROTT,
COMMENTARY ON THE UNIDROIT CONVENTION (Institute of Art and Law 1997) (providing
a comprehensive review of the Convention).
55 FORREST, supra note 52, at 150–53.
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United States56 and the United Kingdom has established.57
A. The 1970 UNESCO Convention and its Domestic
Implementation by Market States
Both the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention regulate the international trade in illegally obtained
archaeological objects, as well as other forms of cultural property.58
However, the 1970 UNESCO Convention has received broader
ratification, particularly among market countries, and it has
therefore had a greater impact on the international trade in
antiquities.59 The 1970 UNESCO Convention, which as a part of
public international law operates on a State-to-State basis, permits
considerable variation in the method of implementation adopted by
the different States Parties with a corresponding significant
variation in effectiveness.60
On the other hand, the UNIDROIT Convention is a part of private
international law, and implementing legislation creates private
rights of action for recovery of stolen and illegally exported cultural
objects.61 It was drafted to appeal to the States that had adopted
some form of the good faith purchaser doctrine, which mandates
that a good faith purchaser can acquire title to stolen property or is,
at the least, entitled to compensation if the purchaser is required to

56 See United States v. Schultz, 178 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 333 F.3d
393 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977) (recognizing
the principle of foreign State ownership); United States v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir.
1979).
57 Iran v. Barakat Galleries Ltd, [2007] EWHC (QB) 705, rev’d, [2007] EWCA (Civ)
1374, [2008] 1 All ER 1177 (UK).
58 See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 7; see also UNIDROIT Convention,
supra note 54.
59 See 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 7 (documenting 140 current States
Parties to the 1970 UNESCO Convention, including the market countries of Austria,
Belgium, Canada, China, France, Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom,
and United States); UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects
(Rome,
1995)
–
Status,
UNIDROIT,
https://www.unidroit.org/status-cp
[https://perma.cc/K2HX-EVNE] (last updated Dec. 2, 2019) (documenting 47 States
Parties, but the only market countries to have ratified it are Italy and China).
60 See O’KEEFE, supra note 53, at 56.
61 See UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (Rome,
1995) – Status, UNIDROIT (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.unidroit.org/status-cp
[https://perma.cc/K2HX-EVNE].

2020 PROVENIENCE & PROVENANCE INTERSECTING WITH INT’L LAW 471

return a stolen object to its original owner.62 The UNIDROIT
Convention requires full implementation of its provisions with little
variation,63 which has proven to be an obstacle to wider State
ratification.64
Most States Parties to the 1970 UNESCO Convention
implement Article 3,65 which states that “[t]he import, export or
transfer of ownership of cultural property effected contrary to the
provisions adopted under this Convention by the States Parties
thereto, shall be illicit.”66 In contrast, U.S. implementation focuses
on Article 9,67 which applies only to archaeological and ethnological
materials.68 Among market countries, one may discern four models
O’KEEFE, supra note 53, at 56–57.
UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 54, art. 18 (not permitting any reservations to
the Convention other than those expressly authorized by the Convention).
64 See UNIDROIT, UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural
Objects (Rome, 1995) – Status (July 16, 2019), https://www.unidroit.org/status-cp
[https://perma.cc/K2HX-EVNE].
65 See O’KEEFE, supra note 53, at 135–38.
66 1970 UNESCO Convention, supra note 7, art. 3. The term “cultural property” is
defined in Article 1 of the Convention and applies to a broad range of objects of artistic,
historical, archaeological, ethnological and scientific interest. Id.
67 Article 9 of the 1970 UNESCO Convention states:
Any State Party to this Convention whose cultural patrimony is in
jeopardy from pillage of archaeological or ethnological materials may
call upon other States Parties who are affected. The States Parties to
this Convention undertake, in these circumstances, to participate in a
concerted international effort to determine and to carry out the
necessary concrete measures, including the control of exports and
imports and international commerce in the specific materials
concerned. Pending agreement each State concerned shall take
provisional measures to the extent feasible to prevent irremediable
injury to the cultural heritage of the requesting State.
Id. art. 9.
68 Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2602–
2603 (2018). The import of undocumented archaeological and ethnological materials into
the United States is restricted under the U.S. implementing legislation, the Convention on
Cultural Property Implementation Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2613, only pursuant to either a
bilateral or multilateral agreement (Memorandum of Understanding) or an emergency
action. While the 1970 UNESCO Convention defines neither term, the CPIA adopts the
following definitions:
The term “archaeological or ethnological material of the State Party”
means —
(A) any object of archaeological interest;
(B) any object of ethnological interest; or
62
63
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of implementation:69 (1) reciprocal import restrictions, which
implement Article 3;70 (2) bilateral agreements implementing
Article 3 (Switzerland)71 or Article 9 (United States);72 (3) hybrid
approaches incorporating principles of the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention;73 and (4) reliance on an inventory or list principle or a
requirement of documentation.74
(C) any fragment or part of any object referred to in subparagraph
(A) or (B); which was first discovered within, and is subject to
export control by, the State Party. For purposes of this paragraph
—
(i) no object may be considered to be an object of
archaeological interest unless such object —
(I) is of cultural significance;
(II) is at least two hundred and fifty years old; and
(III) was normally discovered as a result of scientific
excavation, clandestine or accidental digging, or
exploration on land or under water; and
(ii) no object may be considered to be an object of
ethnological interest unless such object is —
(I) the product of a tribal or nonindustrial society, and
(II) important to the cultural heritage of a people
because of its distinctive characteristics, comparative
rarity, or its contribution to the knowledge of the
origins, development, or history of that people.
Id. § 2601(2). The United States implements other provisions, including Article 7(b)(i)
and parts of Articles 1, 5 and 6. Article 7(b)(i) calls on States Parties to prohibit the import
of stolen cultural property that was documented in the inventory of a “museum or a
religious or secular public monument or similar institution.” 19 U.S.C. § 2607 (2019).
69 See Patty Gerstenblith, Implementation of the 1970 UNESCO Convention by the
United States and Other Market Nations, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO CULTURAL
PROPERTY 70, 71–72, 78–86 (Jane Anderson & Haidy Geismar eds., 2017).
70 Examples include: Canada, Cultural Property Export and Import Act, R.S.C. 1985,
c C-51 § 37(2) (Can.); Australia, Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act, pt II div 2
s 14 sub 1 (as amended in 2011) (Austl.); Germany, Kulturgutschutzgesetz vom 31 [Act
on the Protection of Cultural Property], July 20, 2016, BGBL 1 at 1914 (Ger.). I had
previously referred to this model of implementation as “across-the-board” import
restrictions. Gerstenblith, supra note 69, at 79.
71 Bundesgesetz über den internationalen Kulturgütertransfer [KGTG][Federal Act
on the International Transfer of Cultural Property (Cultural Property Transfer Act)] June
20, 2003, SR 444.1, art 7 (Switz.).
72 Convention on Cultural Property Implementation Act (CPIA), 19 U.S.C. §§ 2602–
2603 (2018).
73 See infra notes 75–86.
74 The only country to adopt this last approach is Japan, but its implementing law is
not useful in preventing the import or trade in looted archaeological artifacts as it applies
only to stolen artifacts that were documented in a public collection. O’KEEFE, supra note
53, at 204–05. For this reason, Japan’s implementation of the convention will not be
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The third model of implementation, adopting a hybrid approach,
requires additional explanation. Without ratifying it, these States
Parties incorporate principles from the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention.
Article 3(2) of the UNIDROIT Convention states that “a cultural
object which has been unlawfully excavated or lawfully excavated
but unlawfully retained shall be considered stolen, when consistent
with the law of the State where the excavation took place.”75 The
Netherlands is an example of a hybrid approach.76 It follows the
reciprocal model of implementation of Article 3 of the 1970
UNESCO Convention in that it prohibits the import of any
cultural property which: has been removed from the territory of a
State Party and is in breach of the provisions adopted by that State
Party, in accordance with the objectives of the 1970 UNESCO
Convention in respect of the export of cultural property from that
State Party or the transfer of ownership of cultural property.77

However, the legislation goes a step further in also prohibiting
the import of cultural property that “has been unlawfully
appropriated in a State Party.”78 The Explanatory Memorandum
that accompanied the legislation clarifies that unlawful
appropriation includes “unlawful excavation at archaeological
sites” and explicitly references the 1995 UNIDROIT Convention’s
equation of unlawful excavation with theft.79 Furthermore, this
provision applies even without establishing that an export control
has been violated.80
The United Kingdom has arguably taken a hybrid approach;
although, unlike the Netherlands, it does not explicitly state this.81

further considered here.
75 UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 54, art. 3(2).
76 The Explanatory Memorandum that accompanied enactment of the Netherlands’
legislation makes clear that it was influenced by various aspects of the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention. Explanatory Memorandum to the Implementing Act 1970 UNESCO
Convention, Parliamentary Documents II 2007/08, 31 255, No. 3, 2–4 [hereinafter
Explanatory Memorandum].
77 Wet van 9 december 2015, houdende bundeling en aanpassing van regels op het
terrain van cultureel erfgoed (Erfgoedwet) [Act of 9 December 2015, Relating to the
Combining and Amendment of Rules Regarding Cultural Heritage (Heritage Act)] §
6.3(a).
78 Id. § 6.3(b).
79 Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 76, at 24.
80 Id.
81 Dealing in Cultural Objects (Offences) Act 2003, c. 27 (UK).
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The United Kingdom did not enact specific implementing
legislation for the 1970 UNESCO Convention, although soon after
ratifying the Convention, it enacted a criminal statute, the Dealing
in Cultural Objects (Offences) Act 2003, which has served as a
means of seizing “tainted objects” upon import82 and incorporates
provisions that are clearly based on Article 3(2) of the 1995
UNIDROIT Convention.83 The legislation defines a “tainted object”
as one that is removed from “a building or structure of historical,
architectural or archaeological interest” or from an excavation.84
The offense is committed “if . . . (a) a person removes the object in
a case falling within subsection (4) or he excavates the object, and
(b) the removal or excavation constitutes an offence.”85 It does not
matter whether the excavation or removal took place in the United
Kingdom or in another country or whether the law violated is a
domestic or foreign law.86
Other States that have ratified both conventions, such as Italy,
have incorporated a similar system of import controls based on the
export controls adopted by other countries through the 1970
UNESCO Convention and the equation of illegal excavation with
theft based on the UNIDROIT Convention.87 While not an
implementation of either the 1970 UNESCO Convention or the
1995 UNIDROIT Convention, the European Union has had internal
controls on the import and export of cultural goods since 1992.88 In
2019, the European Commission adopted a regulation to control the
import of cultural objects from all non-EU Member States.89
82 Id. One commits the offense of dealing in tainted cultural objects by “dishonestly
deal[ing] in a cultural object that is tainted, knowing or believing that the object is tainted.”
Id. § 1(1).
83 Id.
84 Id. § 2(4)–(5).
85 Id. § 2(2).
86 Id. § 2(3).
87 Decreto n.42: codice dei beni culturali e del paesaggio [Code of the Cultural and
Landscape Heritage], D.Lgs. n.42, Jan. 22, 2004, G.U. Supp. n.45, Feb. 24, 2004, art. 87
(It.) (implementing the UNIDROIT Convention).
88 See Council Regulation 116/2009, O.J. (L 39) 1 (EC); Council Directive
2014/60/EU, O.J. (L 159) 1 (EU).
89 Regulation 2019/880 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April
2019 on the Introduction and the Import of Cultural Goods, 2019 O.J. (L 151) para. 5. The
European Union had previously imposed import restrictions on cultural goods illegally
removed from the non-Member States of Iraq, Council Regulation (EC) 1210/2003 of 7
July 2003 concerning certain specific restrictions on economic and financial relations with
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B. State Ownership
The second primary legal mechanism for dealing with the
problem of looted and undocumented archaeological artifacts is
State ownership.90 Many nations rich in archaeological resources
have vested ownership of undiscovered archaeological artifacts in
the State, as a means both of protecting sites from looting and of
imposing consequences on those who engage in looting,
intermediaries and final purchasers.91 Objects that are subject to
national ownership are characterized as stolen property when they
are removed without permission of the State. In United States v.
Schultz92 the Second Circuit recognized the effectiveness of foreign
vesting laws and, in affirming the conviction of the dealer Frederick
Schultz, held that the laws of the country of discovery determined
ownership of the object, but that dealing in and transporting such
objects in the United States constituted a violation of U.S. law,
including the National Stolen Property Act.93
In a comparable, but civil rather than criminal action, the Court
of Appeal in the United Kingdom similarly held that Iran’s national
ownership law established a sufficient right of immediate
possession that Iran could sue a London dealer to recover artifacts

Iraq and repealing Regulation [2003] OJ L169/ 6, and Syria, Council Regulation (EU)
1332/2013 of 13 December 2013 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation
in Syria and amending Regulation (EU) 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view
of the situation in Syria, OJ L335, 14.12.2–13, p. 3.
90 See, e.g., FORREST, supra note 52, at 150–53.
91 Free market proponents, such as James Cuno, have argued that the modern State
has no right to claim artifacts based solely on the fact that the artifacts were excavated
within their modern territorial borders. James Cuno, Art Museums, Archaeology, and
Antiquities in an Age of Sectarian Violence and Nationalist Politics, in THE ACQUISITION
AND EXHIBITION OF CLASSICAL ANTIQUITIES: PROFESSIONAL, LEGAL AND ETHICAL
PERSPECTIVES 9, 23–24 (Robin F. Rhodes ed., 2007). See also Bauer, supra note 26, at
151; Dennis P. Doordan, Response to Malcolm Bell, in THE ACQUISITION AND EXHIBITION
OF CLASSICAL ANTIQUITIES: PROFESSIONAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES 43, 44
(Robin F. Rhodes ed., 2007).
92 United States v. Schultz, 178 F. Supp. 2d 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 333 F.3d
393 (2d Cir. 2003). The Fifth Circuit had previously recognized the principle of foreign
State ownership in United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977); United States
v. McClain, 593 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979).
93 Schultz, 333 F.3d at 402–03; National Stolen Property Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–
2315 (2019) (prohibiting the transport or transfer “in interstate or foreign commerce [of]
any goods . . . for the value of $5,000 or more” as well as receiving, possessing, storing,
selling, or disposing of such goods with knowledge that they were stolen).
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looted from Iran.94 While arguably applying a less stringent analysis
in its evaluation of the Iranian law than the Second Circuit applied
to the Egyptian vesting law in Schultz, the Court of Appeal
distinguished vesting laws from export controls.95 It acknowledged
that such vesting laws were an effective means of protecting
archaeological heritage and congruent with British public policy,
stating that “[i]n our judgment, there are positive reasons of policy
why a claim by a state to recover antiquities which form part of its
national heritage and which otherwise complies with the
requirements of private international law should not be shut out.”96
The McClain and Schultz decisions set out four elements
required for a U.S. court to recognize that an undocumented
archaeological object is owned by a foreign State: (1) the vesting
law must be clearly an ownership law on its face;97 (2) the State’s
ownership rights must be enforced domestically and not only upon
illegal export or attempted illegal export; (3) the object must have
been discovered within the territorial boundaries of the country
claiming ownership; and (4) the object must have been located
within the country at the time the law was enacted.98 The purpose
of the third requirement is to ensure that the ownership law is not
given extraterritorial effect and the purpose of the fourth
requirement is to ensure that the ownership law is not given
retroactive effect.99 The legal roles of provenience and provenance
are particularly relevant in determining whether the third and fourth
requirements are satisfied.
IV. Legal Roles of Provenience and Provenance
The two prongs of the international legal regime establish the
legal definitions of provenance and provenience and their roles in
regulating the market in antiquities. These concepts complement
each other, and both are crucial to proper application of the 1970
94 Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran v. The Barakat Galleries Ltd [2007]
EWHC 705 (QB), rev’d, [2007] EWCA Civ 1374; [2008] 1 All ER 1177.
95 Id.
96 Barakat Galleries Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 1374; [2008] 1 All ER 1177, ¶¶ 154–55.
97 Schultz, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 447; McClain, 545 F.2d at 997–1002. As these
elements are deduced from two criminal prosecutions, it is not certain whether the same
standard of clarity would be required in non-criminal litigation, such as a civil replevin
action or a civil forfeiture action.
98 McClain, 545 F.2d at 997–1002.
99 See id.
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UNESCO and 1995 UNIDROIT Conventions and the principle of
State ownership in the interdiction and recovery of looted
archaeological artifacts.
While the provenience of an
archaeological object or at least the country of modern discovery is
the first step in determining the initial applicable law, the
provenance of an object further informs the legal status of the object
at the time of its interdiction by law enforcement.
A. Where is Legality? The Problem of Location
In the first three models of implementation of the 1970
UNESCO Convention, reciprocal restrictions, bilateral agreements,
and hybrid models,100 knowing the provenience—that is, the place
of modern discovery or at least the country of modern discovery—
is a necessary element in effectuating the 1970 UNESCO
Convention.101 The examples of Germany, which utilizes reciprocal
import restrictions implementing Article 3,102 and the United States,
which relies on bilateral agreements in implementing Article 9,103
illustrate this point. Those countries utilizing reciprocal import
restrictions prohibit the import of any cultural property that is
subject to export restriction from the country of origin.104
Germany’s implementing legislation requires an importer to present
documentation that the cultural property was legally exported if it
left another State Party to the 1970 UNESCO Convention after
2007, the date of Germany’s ratification of the Convention.105 The
importer bears the burden to present such documentation and, in the
absence of such documentation, the cultural property is presumed
to have been unlawfully removed from the relevant State Party after
2007.106
See Gerstenblith, supra note 69.
Id.
102 Id. at 81–83.
103 Id. at 73.
104 Id. at 79–81.
105 FED. GOV’T COMM’R FOR CULTURE & THE MEDIA, KEY ASPECTS OF THE NEW ACT
ON THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN GERMANY 7 (Sept. 2016). Under earlier
legislation, Germany prohibited the import of only those illegally exported cultural objects
that had been individually classified in an accessible inventory by the country of origin at
least one year prior to removal (termed the “list principle”). O’KEEFE, supra note 53, at
195.
106 Key Aspects of the New Act on the Protection of Cultural Property in Germany,
supra note 105.
100
101
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The United States implements Article 9 of the 1970 UNESCO
Convention through a series of bilateral agreements that restrict the
import of archaeological and, in some cases, ethnological
materials107 that fall into a designated category of such materials and
that left the country of modern discovery without an export license
after the date the import restriction went into effect.108 Because the
import of objects is restricted only if the United States has a bilateral
agreement with the country of discovery or has imposed import
restrictions pursuant to an emergency action, it is crucial to know
the provenience of an archaeological object in order to know
whether the import restriction applies to it.109 The United States
currently (as of early 2020) has bilateral agreements with 20
countries, an emergency action for cultural materials from Yemen,
and emergency import restrictions pursuant to special legislation for
cultural materials from Iraq and Syria.110
The difficulty of establishing the country of discovery is
exacerbated by the fact that artifacts may have moved in antiquity
as part of their history before their deposition111 and that the
boundaries of modern countries are not necessarily congruent with
ancient cultures.112 For example, the United States currently
restricts the import of archaeological materials from ten modern
countries that at one time were part of the Roman Empire,113 while
the Roman Empire at various times spanned the borders of
approximately 40 modern countries.114 Differences in style,

See supra note 68 (defining archaeological and ethnological materials).
19 U.S.C. § 2606 (1983).
109 19 U.S.C. § 2601(2)(C) (1983) (defining archaeological or ethnological material
in part as “any fragment or part of any object . . . which was first discovered within, and
is subject to export control by, the State Party”).
110
See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CULTURAL PROPERTY AGREEMENTS,
https://eca.state.gov/files/bureau/cultural_property_agreements.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3QDG-4D46]. Requests for bilateral agreements to impose import
restrictions are currently pending from Chile, Morocco, Yemen, Tunisia and Turkey.
111 See, e.g., infra note 117–18.
112 See, e.g., infra notes 114–15.
113 Current Import Restrictions, BUREAU OF EDUC. & CULTURAL AFF., U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE,
https://eca.state.gov/cultural-heritage-center/cultural-property-advisorycommittee/current-import-restrictions [https://perma.cc/WZT8-WA67].
114 Donald L. Wasson, The Extent of the Roman Empire, in ANCIENT HISTORY
ENCYCLOPEDIA (Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.ancient.eu/article/851/the-extent-of-theroman-empire/ [https://perma.cc/FP9Z-A7XY].
107
108
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material composition115 and other factors among the cultural objects
produced in different parts of the Roman Empire may allow
determination of the location of discovery if the object did not
“travel” in antiquity.116 Knowing the provenience (and therefore the
country of modern discovery) of an object is crucial to knowing
whether import of the object is restricted under the CPIA. In
addition, objects frequently moved in antiquity through territory
that is now part of different modern countries. For example, Attic
black and red-figured pottery of the sixth and fifth centuries BCE
was produced in the region of Athens that is today in the modern
country of Greece.117 However, the best preserved and the most
aesthetically admired examples are, for the most part, found in
Etruria in modern Italy.118
The question then becomes how to establish the provenience of
an artifact. It is important to note that the archaeological or
anthropological definition of provenience depends on the exact
findspot of an artifact.119 In contrast, the legal definition of
provenience is the country within whose modern borders the object
in question was discovered. Use of the archaeological or
115 Technical analyses of the material of an artifact may be of significant help in
determining the country of origin. However, it is not always possible to determine whether
a particular deposit of clay or type of stone occurs within the boundaries of only one
country and, on the other hand, a high degree of specificity is not necessarily required as
to the precise provenience. Finally, to the extent that technical analysis of composition
may indicate the place where the raw materials originated, this may not be the same as the
place of manufacture or, more important for legal purposes, the place of discovery (that is,
the provenience).
116 See generally Richard Neer, Connoisseurship and the Stakes of Style, 23 U. CHI.
CRITICAL INQUIRY J. 1, 3–5 (Autumn 2005) (discussing the role of connoisseurship and
stylistic analysis in attributions of archaeological artifacts).
117 Department of Greek and Roman Art, Athenian Vase Painting: Black- and RedFigure Techniques, in HEILBRUNN TIMELINE OF ART HISTORY, NEW YORK: THE
METROPOLITAN
MUSEUM
OF
ART
(Oct.
2002),
http://www.metmuseum.org/toah/hd/vase/hd_vase.htm [https://perma.cc/XPL4-35FH].
118 Barker, supra note 6, at 26 (discussing the Euphronios krater). Vessels of these
types appear on the designated lists for the bilateral agreements between the United States
and both Greece and Italy. Import Restrictions Imposed on Certain Archaeological and
Ethnological Material from Greece, 76 Fed. Reg. 231, 74691, 74694 (Dec. 1, 2011);
Extension of Import Restrictions Imposed on Archaeological Material Originating in Italy
and Representing the Pre-Classical, Classical, and Imperial Roman Periods (Italy), 76 Fed.
Reg. 12, 3012, 3014 (Jan. 19, 2011). See also Nathan T. Elkins, Ancient Coins, Find Spots,
and Import Restrictions: A Critique of Arguments Made in the Ancient Coin Collectors
Guild’s “Test Case,” 40 J. FIELD ARCHAEOLOGY 236, 240 (2015).
119 See Joyce, From Place to Place, supra note 28 and accompanying text.
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anthropological definition of exact findspot is not necessary120 and
may defeat effective law enforcement efforts if the U.S. government
were to refuse to pursue a case because the exact find spot is not
known. In some cases, the determination of the country of
discovery may be relatively straightforward, if some distinctive
feature, perhaps an inscription, ties the object directly to a site,121 if
a fragment of the same object is discovered at the site,122 or if a
witness observed the looting or there is other direct evidence
indicating or illustrating the object in the process of being looted.123
While this determination must often be made based on indirect or
120 See Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 801 F.
Supp. 2d 383, 408–09 (D. Md. 2011), aff’d, 698 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that the
law does not require the precise find spot to be determined), cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1251
(2013); United States v. 3 Knife-shaped Coins, 246 F. Supp. 3d 1102 (D. Md. 2017), aff’d
sub nom., United States v. Ancient Coin Collectors Guild, 899 F.3d 295 (4th Cir. 2018),
cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1191 (2019).
121 Writing on artifacts may indicate the provenience of an object. Depending on their
type or function, cuneiform tablets may have been buried where they were written and so
finding the name of a city mentioned in a text would indicate where it was found. For
example, the tablets acquired by Hobby Lobby dealt with mundane subjects such as
recording food allocations for palace officials and land allocations. Such tablets would
have been written and buried within the same city. Owen Jarus, Lost City of Irisagrig
Comes to Life in Ancient Stolen Tablets, LIVE SCIENCE (May 30, 2018),
https://www.livescience.com/62688-lost-city-of-irisagrig-ancient-tablets.html
[https://perma.cc/UR7L-9D2J]. However, other types of cuneiform tablets were part of
the trade in goods in antiquity and so, while a city name may be mentioned in a text, this
may not be the place where the tablet was discovered. For example, an extensive trade
was carried on in the early second millennium BCE between the Old Assyrian trading
colonies, such as Karum Kanesh, located in central Turkey, and Mari, located in the eastern
part of what is today Syria, and other cities in northern Mesopotamia. A looted tablet
could be identifiable as belonging to this time period and genre, but it may not be possible
to discern from its contents whether it was found in Turkey, Syria or Iraq. UNESCO,
Archaeological Site of Kültepe-Kanesh, https://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/5905/
[https://perma.cc/6464-UA2D] (last visited Oct. 1, 2019).
122 The lower half of a Roman sculpture of the “Weary Herakles” type was excavated
at the site of Perge in southwestern Turkey, while the upper half had been looted,
purchased by New York collectors Shelby White and Leon Levy, and eventually displayed
at the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston. It took over ten years from the time of the acquisition
of the looted half in 1981 before a comparison of a plaster cast of the portion in Turkey
with the part in Boston established that the site of Perge was the findspot of the Boston
piece. This part of the sculpture was returned to Turkey in 2011. Suzie Thomas, Weary
Herakles, TRAFFICKING CULTURE, https://traffickingculture.org/encyclopedia/casestudies/weary-herakles/ [https://perma.cc/7MWK-EEPA] (last modified Dec. 31, 2012).
123 THOMAS HOVING, MAKING THE MUMMIES DANCE 217 (1994) (explaining that a
Metropolitan Museum of Art junior curator was present at the looting of the Lydian Hoard
from tombs in Western Turkey).
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circumstantial evidence, both direct and indirect evidence are
admissible in court proceedings.124
The burden of establishing country of origin in the case of an
archaeological artifact is mitigated through the types of evidentiary
burden and the shifting of that burden applicable in civil forfeitures
under both the CPIA and under the more generic Customs statute.125
In civil forfeiture actions under the Customs statute (found in Title
19), the generally-applicable burden-shifting statute provides that,
in all forfeiture actions brought against “any . . . merchandise[] or
baggage seized under the provisions of any law relating to the
collection of duties on imports or tonnage . . . the burden of proof
shall lie upon [the] claimant,” although the government must first
demonstrate probable cause that the property is subject to
forfeiture.126
124 See COMM. ON FED. CRIM. JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIR., PATTERN
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS OF THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 12 (2012 ed., rev. 2018),
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/pattern-jury-instructions/7th_criminal_jury_instr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M685-QDSQ] (last visited Sept. 26, 2019) (“Direct evidence is evidence
that directly proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves a
fact . . . [t]he law does not say that one is better than the other.”). Direct evidence is
something that the observer saw; indirect evidence is evidence of a fact that may be
inferred from direct evidence. See United States v. $99,990.00 in U.S. Currency, 69 F.
App’x 757, 763 (6th Cir. 2003) (the amount of money being carried at the time of seizure,
as well as the manner in which it was packed, sufficed to meet the evidentiary requirements
placed upon the government to justify a forfeiture). Unlike direct evidence, circumstantial
evidence allows courts to evaluate the “totality of the circumstances.” Id. In civil
forfeiture cases, courts use circumstantial evidence to determine whether the government
has met its burden. Id. The types of and amount of weight given to circumstantial evidence
varies. Id.
125 Stefan D. Cassella, Using the Forfeiture Laws to Protect Archaeological
Resources, 41 IDAHO L. REV. 129, 135–36 (2004). Forfeiture actions are in rem
proceedings in which the defendant is the property and the claimant is anyone who asserts
an interest in the property at issue, such as an importer or purchaser. Id. at 132–33.
126 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (2019). See United States v. Davis, 648 F.3d 84, 88 (2d Cir.
2011) (applying the burden shifting framework of 19 U.S.C. § 1615 to a stolen painting).
The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act changed several aspects of civil forfeiture law.
Stefan D. Cassella, The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000: Expanded Government
Forfeiture Authority and Strict Deadlines Imposed on All Parties, 27 J. LEGIS. 97, 97
(2001). CAFRA changed the government’s burden of proof to the preponderance of the
evidence standard and added an innocent owner defense. Id. However, CAFRA, 18
U.S.C. §983(i), excludes from these requirements forfeiture proceedings brought under the
Customs statute (Title 19), including forfeitures under the CPIA. Id. at 104. See also
Cassella, Recovering Stolen Art & Antiquities Under the Forfeiture Laws: Who Is Entitled
to the Property When There Are Conflicting Claims, supra note 10 (discussing the role of
civil asset forfeiture in recovering looted art and artifacts).
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In CPIA forfeitures,127 the government has the initial burden to
establish that the material subject to import restriction has been
listed in accordance with 19 U.S.C. § 2604.128 In Ancient Coin
Collectors Guild v. U.S. Customs and Border Protection,129 the
Fourth Circuit elaborated that this means that the government must
establish that the seized material has been (1) listed by type or other
appropriate classification on the Designated List, and (2) listed in a
manner that gives fair notice to importers of those materials that
cannot be imported.130 Once the government has met its initial
burden of proof to the probable cause standard, the burden shifts to
the importer to prove that one of the exceptions under 19 U.S.C. §
2606 applies.131 The importer must prove that the objects are
importable to a preponderance of the evidence standard.132
Courts have considered the extent of the burden to establish the
precise findspot or even the country of discovery of an
archaeological artifact when the U.S. government pursues a civil
forfeiture action under the CPIA. In United States v. Eighteenth
Century Peruvian Oil on Canvas Painting,133 involving illegally
exported Colonial period paintings, there was a question as to
whether the paintings originated from Bolivia or from Peru.134
However, as the same categories of ethnological objects were
covered by the bilateral agreements with both countries,135 the court

127 See 19 U.S.C. § 2606 (2018) (import restrictions on archaeological and
ethnological materials); 19 U.S.C. § 2610 (2018) (evidentiary requirements governing §
2606).
128 United States v. Eighteenth Century Peruvian Oil on Canvas Painting of the
“Doble Trinidad,” 597 F. Supp. 2d 618, 623 (E.D. Va. 2009).
129 Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 698 F.3d
171 (4th Cir. 2012).
130 Id. at 181; United States v. Ancient Coin Collectors Guild, 899 F.3d 295, 314–15
(4th Cir. 2018). See also Eighteenth Century Peruvian Oil on Canvas Painting of the
“Doble Trinidad,” 597 F. Supp. 2d at 623. The ACCG case is discussed in Elkins, supra
note 118.
131 Eighteenth Century Peruvian Oil on Canvas Painting of the “Doble Trinidad,”
597 F. Supp. 2d at 622.
132 Id. at 622–23; Ancient Coin Collectors Guild, 698 F.3d at 181–83. The CPIA
allows objects to be imported under several affirmative defenses. 19 U.S.C. § 2606 (2018).
133 Eighteenth Century Peruvian Oil on Canvas Painting of the “Doble Trinidad,”
597 F. Supp. 2d at 618.
134 Id. at 624–25.
135 19 C.F.R. § 12.104–12.104(i) (2019); Import Restrictions Imposed on
Archaeological and Ethnological Materials from Bolivia, 66 Fed. Reg. 63,490 (notice of
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did not find it necessary to determine which country was the country
of origin.136 This approach is limited, however, to the circumstance
in which all of the likely modern countries of origin have a bilateral
agreement with the United States that covers the same categories of
objects.137
In Ancient Coin Collectors Guild, which involved coins subject
to import restriction pursuant to U.S. bilateral agreements with
China and with Cyprus, the district court further elaborated on the
government’s burden to establish provenience, stating:
For each designated type of coin . . . , coins could fall into one of
three categories depending on whether there is documentation of
where a coin was discovered, known as its “find spot”: (1) coins
that are proven to have been discovered in modern-day China or
Cyprus, (2) coins that are proven to have been discovered
somewhere other than China or Cyprus, and (3) coins for which
the “find spot” is unknown. ACCG concedes that the State
Department has authority to prohibit the importation of coins in
the first category. The government concedes that it does not have
authority to prohibit coins in the second category. The parties’
dispute is limited to whether the State Department has authority
under the CPIA to prohibit the importation of coins with unknown
“find spots” . . . . [I]f there is no record of when and where the
coin was discovered, or of when it was exported from Cyprus,
then importation of the coin is prohibited. This result, ACCG
argues, violates the “first discovered” requirement in the CPIA.
ACCG’s argument misses the mark . . . . [T]he CPIA anticipates
that there may be some archeological objects without precisely
documented provenance and export records and prohibits the
importation of those objects . . . . Thus for objects without
documentation of where and when they were discovered, the
CPIA expressly places the burden on importers to prove that they
are importable, and prohibits the importation of those objects if
they cannot meet that burden.

final rule Dec. 7, 2001) (codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 12); Extension of Import Restrictions
Imposed on Archaeological and Ethnological Materials from Peru, 82 Fed. Reg. 26340
(notice of final rule June 7, 2017) (codified at 19 C.F.R. pt. 12).
136 United States v. Eighteenth Century Peruvian Oil on Canvas Painting of the
“Doble Trinidad,” 597 F. Supp. 2d 618, 624–25 (E.D. Va. 2009).
137 For this reason, the designated lists that accompany the various Memoranda of
Understanding should be written to be congruent to the extent that similarities in material
culture permit.
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***
[I]nterpreting the “first discovered in” requirement to preclude the
State Department from barring the importation of archaeological
objects with unknown find spots would undermine the core
purpose of the CPIA, namely, to deter looting of cultural
property . . . . Looted objects are, presumably, extremely unlikely
to carry documentation, or at least accurate documentation, of
when and where they are discovered and when they were exported
from the country in which they were discovered. Congress is
therefore unlikely to have intended to limit import restrictions to
objects with a documented find spot.138

It is worth noting that the court adopted the definition of find spot
(that is, provenience) as the country of discovery and not a specific
archaeological site.139
In the Ancient Collectors Guild litigation, the ACCG argued that
the government had imposed import restrictions on types of ancient
coins based on their place of production rather than on their place
of discovery.140 However, this argument ignored three points. First,
certain types of coins tended not to circulate from their place of
production.141 Second, the archaeological evidence demonstrates
the high probability that the designated types of coins produced in
Cyprus would be discovered in Cyprus, and that coins minted
outside of Cyprus but likely to be discovered in Cyprus were
included on the designated list for Cyprus.142 This point needs to be
understood in light of the government’s low evidentiary burden,
which requires less than a fifty percent likelihood under the
probable cause standard.143 Third, as the number of countries within
which the same types of coins circulated in antiquity increases, the
government does not need to establish exactly which of those

138 Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 801 F.
Supp. 2d 383, 408–09 (D. Md. 2011), aff’d, 698 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2012).
139 See id. (referring to find spots as the countries where coins came from and not the
specific archaeological sites).
140 801 F. Supp. 2d at 406–07.
141 Elkins, supra note 118, at 238.
142 Id. at 238–41 (discussing the listing of ancient coins in the U.S. agreements with
Cyprus, Italy, Greece and Bulgaria). Elkins points out that the analysis of the import
restrictions on ancient coins should parallel that of the restriction on import of ancient
vessels that may be discovered in either Greece or Italy. Id.
143 Ancient Coin Collectors Guild, 801 F. Supp. 2d at 399 n.11. See also 19 U.S.C. §
1615 (2018) (laying out the burden of proof for this type of forfeiture proceeding).
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countries is the country of discovery.144
In light of this analysis, it is clear that under the CPIA the
government does not have the burden to prove the exact find spot
of an archaeological object.145 Further, to the extent that the
government needs to establish the country of discovery, it needs to
meet only the probable cause evidentiary standard.146 Finally, if the
country of discovery is unknown, the burden falls on the importer
to prove that the provenience of the object at issue is not the country
with which the United States has a bilateral agreement.147
Characterizing an archaeological object as stolen property
pursuant to State ownership also requires knowledge of the
provenience of the object. The object must have been discovered
within the borders of the country claiming ownership at the time the
vesting statute was enacted, so as to avoid extraterritorial
application of the statute.148 Therefore, the government has the
same challenge to establish the country of discovery.149 A country
could bring a claim as a private litigant to recover such
archaeological artifacts on the ground that they are stolen property
but then has the initial burden of establishing the country of
discovery to the preponderance of the evidence standard.150 While
144 See United States v. Eighteenth Century Peruvian Oil on Canvas Painting of the
“Doble Trinidad,” 597 F. Supp. 2d 618, 625–26 (E.D. Va. 2009) (finding that it did not
matter if the paintings that the government sought to forfeit came from Bolivia or Peru).
145 Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 801 F.
Supp. 383, 408–09 (D. Md. 2011), aff’d, 698 F.3d 171 (4th Cir. 2012).
146 See supra note 143.
147 See Ancient Coin Collectors Guild, 801 F. Supp. at 408–09 (“Thus for objects
without documentation of where and when they were discovered, the CPIA expressly
places the burden on importers to prove that they are importable, and prohibits the
importation of those objects if they cannot meet that burden.”). To some extent, this
shifting of the burden of proof onto the importer to prove (or disprove) the country of
discovery is parallel to the shifting of the burden of proof under the German law
implementing the 1970 UNESCO Convention. See Key Aspects of the New Act on the
Protection of Cultural Property in Germany, supra note 105.
148 McClain, 545 F.2d at 1001–03; Peru v. Johnson, 720 F. Supp. 810, 812 (C.D. Cal.
1989), aff’d sub nom., Peru v. Wendt, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 10385, *4–*5 (9th Cir.
1991).
149 See Schultz, 178 F. Supp. 2d at 447; McClain, 545 F.2d at 997–1003.
150 Republic of Turkey v. OKS Partners, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17032 (D. Mass.
1994) (bringing suit to recover hoard of rare ancient coins, known as the “Elmali Hoard”);
Republic of Turkey v. Metro. Museum, 762 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (suit to recover
group of 360 antiquities, known as the “Lydian hoard”). Both cases settled with virtually
all objects returned to Turkey after preliminary litigation. For restitution of the Lydian
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countries have brought such claims in the past, at this time, in what
may be termed “second generation” cultural property cases, the U.S.
government undertakes most such cases in the form of civil
forfeitures on behalf of the foreign owner in which the government
must prove the elements of its claim only to the probable cause
standard.151 Such forfeiture cases are typically pursued under the
“contrary to law” provision of the Customs statute,152 but the
hoard, see Lawrence M. Kaye & Carla T. Main, The Saga of the Lydian Hoard: from Usak
to New York and Back Again, in ANTIQUITIES: TRADE OR BETRAYED—LEGAL, ETHICAL
AND CONSERVATION ISSUES 150–51 (Kathryn W. Tubb ed. 1995). A civil forfeiture action
should be distinguished from a civil replevin action. In the latter case, the country as
plaintiff must establish its right of ownership, which means it would have the initial burden
of proving by the preponderance of the evidence standard the provenience of the artifact
or at least the country of modern discovery. Patty Gerstenblith, Criminal Law and
Forfeiture in the Recovery of Cultural Objects, in ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL
HERITAGE LAW 150, 160–62 (Francesco Francioni & James Gordley eds. 2013).
151 Id. at 167–71. A civil forfeiture claim is less likely to be barred by a statute of
limitation or laches defense in comparison to a private replevin action. Id.; 19 U.S.C. §§
1615, 1621 (2018) (barring civil forfeiture and other actions under the customs laws five
years after the time when the alleged offense was discovered or, in the case of forfeiture,
within two years after the time when the involvement of the property in the alleged offense
was discovered, whichever is later). A suit to recover stolen property in a private replevin
action is generally subject to the statute of limitation enacted by the forum state in which
the suit is brought; while the time period is highly variable, it ranges typically from two to
six years but is also subject to judicial determination of the accrual of the cause of action.
For a summary of relevant court decisions in the context of works of art and cultural
property, see generally Patty Gerstenblith, Statutes of Limitation and Other Legal
Challenges to the Recovery of Stolen Art, in THE PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF ART CRIME
271, 274–79 (Saskia Maria Hufnagel & Duncan Chappell eds. 2019).
152 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(1)(A) (2018). See also infra note 186. The import of stolen
property is prohibited under the National Stolen Property Act (NSPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2314–
2315 (2018) (prohibiting, inter alia, the transport across an international boundary of
stolen goods valued at $5000 or more with knowledge that the goods were stolen). The
proceeds of a violation of the NSPA are directly forfeitable under CAFRA, 18 U.S.C. §
981(a)(1)(C). However, because of the less favorable burden of proof and the availability
of an innocent owner defense under CAFRA, forfeitures of stolen property would likely
be pursued under 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(1)(A) in which the law in the “contrary to law”
element would be the NSPA. The government would still need to show that the importer
knew that the property was stolen but would only need to establish knowledge to the
probable cause standard rather than to the criminal standard. For discussion of CAFRA,
see supra note 126. The CPIA does not require any knowledge or scienter on the part of
the importer and, like all forfeiture actions under Title 19, has no innocent owner defense.
While CAFRA poses a problem for forfeiture of antiquities and other cultural objects that
originate in and are transported only interstate, all antiquities discussed in this article were
discovered in other countries and therefore entered the United States at some point.
Therefore, in such cases, the provisions of the Customs statute will always be a potential
avenue for the government to pursue civil forfeiture.
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handling of stolen property can also be the basis for criminal
prosecutions.153
B. When is Legality? The Problem of Time
It is a basic principle of international law that laws and treaties
are not retroactive in nature—in other words, they have no legal
effect until after a particular country has ratified the treaty and, in
some cases, enacted domestic implementing legislation.154 This is
true not only of the 1970 UNESCO Convention, the 1995 UNIDROIT
Convention and the various statutes by which these conventions are
implemented into domestic law, but it is also true of States’
ownership statutes.155 The latter means that the archaeological
artifact has to have been located within the country of discovery at
the time the vesting law was enacted.156 Thus is posed not only the
problem of determining the provenience, but also the provenance of
the object. While archaeologists and anthropologists consider the
pre-deposition history of an artifact as part of its history,157 from a
153 See, e.g., United States v. McClain, 545 F. 2d 988 (5th Cir. 1977), appeal after
remand, 593 F. 2d 658 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Schultz, 178 F. Supp. 2d 445
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 333 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2003).
154 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states:
Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise
established, its provisions do not bind a party in relation to any act or
fact which took place or any situation which ceased to exist before the
date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to that party.
art. 28, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Domestic implementing legislation is required
for the terms of a treaty to be enforceable domestically in the case of non-self-executing
(executory) treaties. It is more likely that multilateral treaties will be interpreted as nonself-executing, while bilateral treaties are more likely to be treated as self-executing.
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505–14 (2008); see also Jean Galbraith, Making Treaty
Implementation More Like Statutory Implementation, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1309, 1316–20
(2017); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM.
J. INT’L L. 695, 695–97 (1995).
155 O’KEEFE, supra note 53, at 101 (explaining that the 1970 UNESCO Convention
has no provision on retroactivity because this was understood not to be necessary);
UNIDROIT Convention, art. 10 (1)–(2) (stating that the Convention applies only to cultural
objects that were stolen or illegally exported after the entry into force of the Convention);
United States v. McClain, 545 F.2d 988, 1000–03 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that only
artifacts exported after Mexico’s enactment of a national vesting law were owned by
Mexico).
156 Schultz, 333 F.3d at 398 (describing Egypt’s vesting law as applying to artifacts
discovered after 1983).
157 Kersel and others have considered at length the pre-deposition history of an
archaeological object as part of its itinerary and provenance. Kersel, Itinerant Objects,
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legal perspective, the pre-deposition history of an artifact is not
relevant. The legal definition of provenance is the history of
ownership of an object from the time of its modern discovery. In
most cases, only by knowing the chain of ownership and the
different steps by which the object moved can one determine the
time at which the object left the country of discovery and therefore
what laws are applicable as it moves through the market and across
borders.158
Establishing when an artifact left its country of discovery is, if
anything, even more difficult than establishing the country of
discovery. A terminus post quem (that is, a time after which) for
the discovery of the artifact may place the object securely within the
country of discovery up to a certain point in time. Often this date
can be determined only by tracing the provenance of the object back
to at least its time of export. A verified, documented provenance
would be direct evidence of this time of removal. For example, in
United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold,159 the government was
able to establish the provenance of the phiale and its movement
from the time of its discovery in Sicily, through the hands of various
looters, smugglers and dealers, to the time it was removed illegally
from Italy and imported into the United States.160 Such evidence is
not always available, but circumstantial evidence may fill the gap.
An example of circumstantial evidence is the study done by
Ricardo Elia of Apulian red-figure vases.161 Apulian red-figure
vases were produced in southern Italy during the fourth century
BCE.162
Two researchers, A.D. Trendall and Alexander
Cambitoglou, published lists of over 14,000 Apulian vases known

supra note 26, at 596–99.
158 See United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, known as a Gold Phiale
Mesomphalos c. 400 B.C., 991 F. Supp. 222, 224–27 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, 184 F.3d
131, 133 (2d Cir. 1999), cert. denied sub nom. Steinhardt v. United States, 528 U.S. 1136
(2000).
159 Id.
160 Id., 991 F. Supp. at 224–27, 184 F.3d at 133.
161 Ricardo J. Elia, Analysis of the Looting, Selling and Collecting of Apulian RedFigure Vases: a Quantitative Approach, in TRADE IN ILLICIT ANTIQUITIES: THE
DESTRUCTION OF THE WORLD’S ARCHAEOLOGICAL HERITAGE 145 (Neil Brodie, Jennifer
Doole & Colin Renfrew eds., 2001). La Follette discusses the possibility of reconstructing
provenance for Attic pottery based on the work of J.D. Beazley. La Follette, The Trial of
Marion True, supra note 5, at 56.
162 Elia, supra note 161, at 146.
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as of the year 1979, along with their then current locations and
owner, previous owners, and findspot.163 Subsequent publications
covered additional vases that surfaced between 1980 and 1992.164
Elia’s study of these publications indicated that 99.4 percent of the
vases with a definitive findspot were found within Italy.165 While
Apulian vases have been collected for over 200 years and have been
widely dispersed to collections throughout the world, the Trendall
and Cambitoglou publications allow the inference to be drawn that
any vase not present in these publications first appeared after
1992.166 These publications provide a terminus post quem for time
of discovery of any vase that does not appear in these
publications.167 Italy has vested ownership of archaeological
artifacts in the State since at least 1939;168 those vases first appearing
after 1980 would therefore be considered State property and would
be characterized as stolen.169 On the other hand, the U.S.-Italy
Memorandum of Understanding under the CPIA dates only to
January 2001.170 Knowing whether an artifact left Italy before or
after 2001 would be crucial in determining the MOU could be used
by the United States to recover and return the object.
In a few instances, a looted object may be recontextualized,
thereby giving both the exact findspot and the time at which the
artifact was discovered.171
Malcolm Bell was able to
recontextualize the “Morgantina treasure,” a group of fifteen silver
objects of Hellenistic date looted in 1980-1981 from the site of
Morgantina in central Sicily and purchased by the Metropolitan
Museum of Art soon after.172 Re-excavation of the area where the
treasure was looted allowed identification of the exact findspot and
Id. at 145.
164 Id. at 146.
165 Only 945 of the vases had definitive findspots; of these, only five were found
outside of Italy. Id. at 146–47.
166 Id. at 146.
167 Id. at 150–52.
168 United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, known as a Gold Phiale Mesomphalos
c. 400 B.C., 991 F. Supp. 222, 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d, 184 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir.
1999).
169 Id.
170 Memorandum of Understanding, It.-U.S., Jan. 19, 2001, T.I.A.S. No. 11-119.
171 Malcolm Bell III, Italian Antiquities in America, 7 ART ANTIQUITY & L. 195, 202–
03 (2002).
172 Id. See also La Follette, The Trial of Marion True, supra note 5, at 40.
163
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a more accurate dating of the original deposit of the objects, as well
as a determination of when the objects were looted.173
C. What is Legality? Objects in Transit
An illegal antiquity is one whose history or handling involves
some violation of law. As has previously been discussed, an
antiquity may be characterized as stolen property if it is removed
from its country of modern discovery in violation of a national law
vesting ownership of antiquities in the State174 or it may be subject
to export or import restriction or both.175 In line with Joyce’s third
paradigm for determining authenticity,176 we must also consider
how an object’s legal status may change as it moves internationally
and crosses the final border of the country where it is located at the
time of its interception. Thus, an object that was illegally excavated
or one that was legally obtained but illegally exported may be legal
in a transit or destination country whose laws have not been violated
by such conduct. Even a stolen object may be considered legally
obtained in a country that recognizes the good faith purchaser
doctrine.177 A legal object may become illegal if it is improperly
173 See Bell III, supra note 171, at 202–03; La Follette, Looted Antiquities, Art
Museums and Restitution, supra note 36, at 685.
174 Supra notes 91–93 and accompanying text.
175 Supra notes 68–89 and accompanying text.
176 As Joyce wrote, “[W]hat we consider authentic is fluid, because things themselves
were and continue to be in motion, both literally (as ownership changes, as physical storage
location changes, and as things move about for exhibition) and metaphorically, as things
are debated, published, challenged, interrogated, and even, prosaically, merely
catalogued.” Joyce, When Is Authentic?, supra note 21, at 54.
177 The continental European countries have adopted the good faith purchaser
doctrine, under which a good faith purchaser may be able to acquire title to stolen property,
in contrast to the rule of common law countries, such as the United States, where a thief
can never convey title. Charles A. Palmer, Recovering Stolen Art: Avoiding Pitfalls, 82
MICH. B. J. 20, 22 (June 2003) (discussing how common law and civil law differ in their
approach to good faith purchasers). Transferring stolen property to a good faith purchaser
in a country that follows the good faith purchaser doctrine allows title to be laundered. Id.
Courts in common law countries use a choice of law or conflicts of law analysis to decide
whether to apply the good faith purchaser doctrine. See generally Patricia Youngblood
Reyhan, A Chaotic Palette: Conflict of Laws in Litigation Between Original Owners and
Good-Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art, 50 DUKE L. J. 955 (2001). European courts typically
use the lex situs rule—that is, they apply the law of the jurisdiction where movable property
was located at the time of the transaction by which the current possessor claims to have
acquired title. Id. at 1014. In two cases involving cultural objects, British courts chose to
apply the law of a foreign jurisdiction, Islamic Republic of Iran v. Berend, [2007] EWHC
132 (QB), [2007] 2 All ER (Comm) 132 (applying French law), and Winkworth v. Christie,
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imported into the country where it is currently located.178 Or,
conversely, an object that is illegally exported from one country is
not illegal in an importing country in the absence of adherence to an
agreement, such as the 1970 UNESCO Convention, by which the
importing country makes illegal export from another country a
violation of the law of the importing country.179 This variation in
applicable laws allows title to objects, particularly to antiquities, to
be laundered if they are passed through or are ultimately located in
countries whose laws do not regard them as illegal.180
An understanding of an object’s post-discovery provenance will
elucidate an object’s trajectory as it changes legal status while
crossing international borders. However, for practical purposes, the
relevant status is the status of the object in the country where it is
intercepted by law enforcement or where a claimant brings suit to
Manson & Woods Ltd [1980] 1 Ch 496 1 All E.R. 1121, [1980] 2 WLR 7 (applying Italian
law). However, in City of Gotha v. Sotheby’s, [1998] 1 WLR 114 (Q.B. 1998), the court
refused to apply German law under the exceptions to the lex situs rule where the current
possessor is the thief or has acted in bad faith or where applying the law of a foreign
jurisdiction would be contrary to English public policy. In the United States, courts
typically choose to apply the law of the jurisdiction where the property is located at the
time of suit or the jurisdiction that is considered to have the most significant contacts with
the gravamen of the suit. See, e.g., Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 143–45 (2d Cir. 2010).
In some cases, U.S. courts have considered the law of a foreign jurisdiction in an
alternative analysis. See, e.g., Autocephalous Greek-Orthodox Church of Cyprus v.
Goldman & Feldman Fine Arts, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 1374, 1393–95 (S. Ind. 1989) (applying
Indiana law but also discussing Swiss law), aff’d, 917 F.2d 278 (7th Cir. 1990), and Greek
Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem v. Christie’s, Inc., No. 98 CIV. 7664 (KMW), 1999
WL 673347, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (applying New York law but also discussing French
law). In Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., where jurisdiction was based
on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the court applied the substantive law of Spain
pursuant to federal common law. 862 F.3d 951, 960–64 (9th Cir. 2017).
178 Patty Gerstenblith, The Legal Framework for the Prosecution of Crimes Involving
Archaeological Objects, 64 U.S. ATT’YS BULL. 5, 8 (2016).
179
Robert K. Paterson, The Legal Dynamics of Cultural Property Export Controls:
Ortiz Revisited, U.B.C. L. REV. (Special Issue) 241, 247–50 (1995); see also Paul M.
Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 STANFORD L. REV. 275, 287 (1982)
(“The fact that an art object has been illegally exported does not in itself bar it from lawful
importation into the United States; illegal export does not itself render the importer (or one
who took from him) in any way actionable in a US. court; the possession of an art object
cannot be lawfully disturbed in the United States solely because it was illegally exported
from another country”).
180 Thomas W. Pecoraro, Choice of Law in Litigation to Recover National Cultural
Property: Efforts at Harmonization in Private International Law, 31 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 1
(1990) (“Stolen works are generally ‘laundered’ through a series of sales to buyers with
progressively less knowledge of the work’s taint.”).
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recover the object as that is the jurisdiction with physical control of
the object. For this purpose, the manner in which a cultural object
enters a country plays a significant role in the ultimate
determination of whether an object may be recovered and returned
to the country of origin.181
Countries typically require the declaration upon import of
commercial goods or goods with a value above a certain amount.182
While the details vary considerably by country, the requirements for
a declaration include the country of origin, the value of the goods,
and what the goods are.183 These declarations determine whether
the goods are importable and the amount of customs duty or tariff
that the importer must pay.184 In the case of typical commercial
goods, “country of origin” usually refers to the place of manufacture
or a place where substantial changes were made to the goods.185
While a false declaration may be made to mislead a Customs agent,
the false declaration is itself another violation of the law and may
constitute a distinct basis for forfeiture.186
Several cases demonstrate the use of false declarations directly
related to the importation of artifacts into the United States.187 Case

See Palmer, supra note 177.
See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. §1484 (a) (1) (2019).
183 See, e.g., U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, IMPORTING INTO THE UNITED
STATES: A GUIDE FOR COMMERCIAL IMPORTERS (last revised 2006),
https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Importing%20into%20the%20U.S.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SE2U-MDVC].
184 DAMON V. PIKE & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CUSTOMS LAW 25, 71 (2012). The
United States exempts works of art from the payment of tariffs. Payne-Aldrich Tariff Act
of 1909, ch. 6, 36 Stat. 11 §§ 714–717.
185 PIKE & FRIEDMAN, supra note 184, at 281.
186 18 U.S.C. § 542 (2019) (“Whoever enters or introduces . . . into the commerce of
the United States any imported merchandise by means of any fraudulent or false invoice,
declaration . . . or by means of any false statement . . . or makes any false statement in
any declaration without reasonable cause to believe the truth of such statement . . . [shall
be guilty of a crime].”). A false declaration constitutes an importation contrary to law and
may be a violation of either 18 U.S.C. § 545 (2019) (“Whoever fraudulently or knowingly
imports or brings into the United States, any merchandise contrary to law . . . [shall be
subject to criminal penalties]. . . . Merchandise introduced into the United States in
violation of this section . . . shall be forfeited to the United States”) or 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)
(2019) (“Merchandise which is introduced or attempted to be introduced into the United
States contrary to law shall be treated as follows: (1) The merchandise shall be seized and
forfeited if it—(A) is stolen, smuggled or clandestinely imported or introduced.”). The
former is a criminal provision while the latter authorizes civil forfeiture.
187 See, e.g., United States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, known as a Gold Phiale
181
182
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law clearly indicates that the country of origin is the provenience or
country of modern discovery, rather than the place of manufacture
or production in antiquity.188 In one of the earlier modern cultural
property cases, a gold phiale discovered in Sicily was imported into
the United States through the use of false declarations as to country
of origin, which was stated to be Switzerland, through which the
phiale was transported, rather than Italy, where the bowl was
discovered, and as to value, which was declared as $250,000,
although the dealer had purchased it for $1.2 million.189 The bowl
was forfeited and returned to Italy.190
In a more recent case, the Hobby Lobby Corporation forfeited
to the U.S. government approximately 3,450 ancient cuneiform
tablets and clay bullae acquired for its Museum of the Bible, as well
as an additional 144 cylinder seals and $3 million.191 In this case,
the archaeological artifacts, which originated in Iraq, were falsely
declared as to what they were (declared to be ceramic tiles), their
country of origin (falsely stated to be Turkey and Israel), and their
value, which was stated to be significantly lower in order to utilize
an informal entry process thereby attempting to evade Customs
scrutiny.192 Citing to the false declarations, as well as other legal
violations,193 the U.S. government forfeited these artifacts as
imported contrary to law.194 The resolution of this case provides
further support for the legal definition of provenience as the country
of discovery, as suggested here, and not necessarily the specific
findspot. It is known, based on the textual information in the tablets,
that the tablets originated from an ancient city called “Irisaĝrig” and
that Irisaĝrig is located in southern Iraq. However, the exact
location and therefore the exact findspot of these tablets are not
Mesomphalos c. 400 B.C., 184 F.3d 131, 133 (2d Cir. 1999).
188 Id. at 135.
189 Id. at 133.
190 Id.
191 United States v. Approximately Four Hundred Fifty (450) Cuneiform Tablets,
17CV03980 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
192 Id. at ¶¶ 33–42.
193 Id. at ¶¶ 7–10, 50–52. These other violations included export in violation of Iraq’s
national ownership laws and import in violation of U.S. import restrictions under the
CPIA.
194 Id. The forfeiture of $3 million was as substitute res in place of “dissipated”
property or merchandise imported or attempted to be imported between 2009 and 2011.
Id. ¶ 11.
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known.195 Because Irisagrig can be located in southern Iraq, the
legal conclusion can be drawn that the artifacts originated in Iraq,
thereby subjecting the artifacts to the legal rules based on Iraq’s
national ownership law and the restrictions on import of antiquities
from Iraq.
Two similar smuggling attempts of ancient artifacts were
interdicted in the United Kingdom. One also involved a group of
cuneiform tablets, which were falsely declared upon entry at
Heathrow Airport.196 Their country of origin was declared to be the
United Arab Emirates, they were described as handmade miniature
clay tiles, and they were given an implausible valuation.197 Scholars
at the British Museum subsequently identified them as originating
at the sites of Umma, Larsa, and the unknown site of Irisaĝrig, all
of which are located within modern Iraq.198 In another example,
U.K. customs authorities seized and returned an ancient Greek
sculpture that was found at the site of Cyrene in Libya.199 Upon
import into the United Kingdom, its country of origin was declared
to be Turkey and its value to be £72,000, rather than its actual worth
that was later estimated to be £1.5 million.200
195 MARCEL SIGRIST AND TOHRU OZAKI, TABLETS FROM THE IRISAĜRIG ARCHIVE
(Eisenbrauns 2020); Owen Jarus, 1,400 Ancient Cuneiform Tablets Identified from Lost
City of Irisagrig in Iraq. Were they Stolen?, LIVE SCIENCE (Jan. 6, 2020),
https://www.livescience.com/lost-city-in-iraq-cuneiformtablets.html?fbclid=IwAR1F4hwm4PyAIUyy0M_lkw34qsVacVynhxKDgzUBnho77W
w4UirpXi4Uli0 [https://perma.cc/EV36-FDA2]. This additional cache of 1,400 tablets
from Irisagrig are said to be owned by Hobby Lobby but were not among the artifacts
returned to Iraq pursuant to the forfeiture action. United States v. Approximately Four
Hundred Fifty (450) Cuneiform Tablets, et al., 17CV03980 (E.D.N.Y. 2016).
196 Jonathan Taylor (@JonTaylor_BM), TWITTER (Aug. 30, 2019, 4:57 AM),
https://twitter.com/JonTaylor_BM/status/1167405875168010240
[https://perma.cc/SEM4-7YRT]. The tablets are likely to be associated with the Hobby
Lobby tablets.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Agency, Ancient Greek Relic Looted from Libya to be Returned, THE TELEGRAPH
(Sept.
1,
2015)
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/environment/archaeology/11837886/AncientGreek-relic-looted-from-Libya-to-be-returned.html [https://perma.cc/P6FU-PQSA].
200 HM Revenue & Customs v. Al Qassas, unpublished, Westminster Magistrates
Court (Sept. 1, 2015); Neil Brodie, The Role of Conservators in Facilitating the Theft and
Trafficking of Cultural Objects: the Case of a Seized Libyan Statue, 48 LIBYAN STUD. 117,
118 (2017); Ancient Greek Relic Looted from Libya to be Returned, THE TELEGRAPH (Sept.
1,
2015),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/earth/environment/archaeology/11837886/Ancient-
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V. Conclusion
The terms provenience and provenance appear frequently in
both the legal literature and case law and in the scholarly literature
of the disciplines of art history, archaeology, and anthropology. To
understand the role that these concepts play in the latter context
when applied specifically to previously unknown archaeological
artifacts that were looted from the ground, the definition of
provenience as the find spot and of provenance from the time of the
creation of the object to its time of deposition and then its postdeposition history is appropriate. However, in order to apply these
concepts in the legal realm the definitions of these terms must be
altered.
This Article has proposed that the legal definition of
provenience, while still technically applying to the precise find spot,
indicates the modern country within whose borders the object was
discovered, whether through excavation or through looting. The
legal definition of the term provenance is the history of the
ownership and custody of the artifact from the time of its modern
discovery to its present location, thus omitting its ancient, predeposition history. In this way, these terms that derive from the
disciplines of art history, anthropology, and archaeology, on the one
hand, and are used in the discipline of law, on the other, can be
clarified and better understood. These definitional terms reflect the
dimensions of time, space and movement that form an object’s legal
itinerary and allow these concepts to be better understood in their
legal context and application. This is the first step in achieving an
accepted legal definition for these terms so that laws can be more
effectively devised and enforced, in order to promote the
preservation of the world’s archaeological heritage.

Greek-relic-looted-from-Libya-to-be-returned.html [https://perma.cc/P6FU-PQSA]. As
in the case of forfeitures in the United States, the forfeited property becomes owned by the
Crown and then, in the case of the ancient sculpture and the cuneiform tablets, returned to
the rightful owners, in these cases Libya and Iraq respectively.
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